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Introduction
The COVID pandemic yielded some interesting political outcomes, one of them being
that some progressives have looked to the states for the advancing of progressive policies and
away from Washington. This can be seen in recent articles where progressives speak wooingly of
the “the tenth amendment,” “states' rights,” and the “laboratories of democracy” which seems to
suggest a warming to a more traditional view of federalism and a retreat from progressive-styled
cooperative federalism. During the pandemic, progressives are calling some state governors
“national heroes”1 and praising the virtues of decentralization.2
Not long ago, a different and even hostile stance toward the state’s involvement in
policymaking was the norm among progressives. Progressives advanced the view of
“cooperative federalism” which posited a strong central national government with states serving
as mostly administrators of national policy. States were considered by progressives as too
parochial to be the impetus for national policy making.
What should we think of this shift in attitude among some progressives? The pandemic
presents an unprecedented crisis that has come to bear on American politics. And because the
COVID pandemic is so unprecedented, norms and benchmarks based on experience are difficult
to establish. In the area of cooperative federalism, it is difficult to determine “who does what,”
especially in an era when Washington can step in and preempt almost any area of policy.
Cooperative federalism is now considered “national federalism,” and even the federalism
intended by the framers.3
In this paper, I will focus on whether recent progressive praise for state policy leadership
and cooperative federalism represent a fundamental shift in progressive ideology or is merely a
tactical move by progressives brought on by other factors. The limited focus of this paper will be
on Louis Brandeis's concept of the “laboratories of democracy,” which is often associated with
state policy innovation. Both conservatives and liberals have used the metaphor for many years.
Here, the focus will be on progressive ideologues and their recent use of the metaphor. Finally, I
will consider some of the implications for federalism and a Christian worldview.

The Laboratories of Democracy
This investigation focuses on the concept of the “laboratories of democracy” as it has
been used when addressing state policy innovation. In 2020, several articles, popular and
academic, were written that used the “laboratories of democracy” as a metaphor for the role of
state policy leadership during the crisis.
Clay Jenkinson, “Who's in Charge? Coronavirus and the Tenth Amendment.” Governing, April
17, 2020. https://www.governing.com/context/Whos-in-Charge-Coronavirus-and-the-TenthAmendment.html (accessed February 13, 2021).
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Archon Fung, “Covid-19 Requires More Democracy, Not Less.” Boston Review, April 23, 2020.
http://bostonreview.net/politics/archon-fung-covid-19-requires-more-democracy-not-less
(accessed January 13, 2021).
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Like that advocated by Samuel Beer in To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American
Federalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
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The phrase “laboratories of democracy” comes from Justice Louis Brandeis in the court
case New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann in (1932) in which he said that “a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country."4 According to Brandeis's quote, individual states can
pursue distinct policy solutions that were created by other states to improve their state's policies.
With respect to the recent pandemic, some progressives are characterizing the acts of some states
as trying “novel” policies in hopes of confronting the spread of the virus and regarding these
policies as “courageous.”
If progressives are praising states for acting without Washington’s direction during the
pandemic, and perhaps even contrary to it, and if they are extolling the benefits of “state
innovation” and the constitutional tenth amendment, it signals a different attitude among
progressives that historically champions bold central government action, especially during a
crisis, and views states as inadequate to provide leadership during a national crisis. The
progressive federalist theory of choice has been one that opposed the framer’s form of
decentralized federalism, what scholars call “cooperative federalism.”
Progressivism and Cooperative Federalism
Varying theories of federalism have surfaced since the beginning of the republic.
According to Professor Corwin (1950) the traditional idea of dual federalism gave rise to a
“cooperative federalism” that favored a national-state relationship characterized by national
dominance and state compliance, where the states and Washington might cooperate, but where
the states are the “inferior governments” in the federal relationship.5 George W. Carey noted that
one of the two great issues of federalism in modern times is the extent of the national powers v.
those of the states.6 Cooperative federalism provides a vision for the extent of national powers
over the powers of the states.
For much of American history, the United States operated under a theory of dual
federalism which consigned most policies to the states based on the tenth amendment’s reserved
powers, and some important delegated powers to the national government. This traditional idea
of dual federalism gave way to a modern version called cooperative federalism that Professor
Corwin called “a short expression for a constantly increasing concentration of power at
Washington in the instigation and supervision of local policies.”7
Cooperative federalism is progressive federalism. Early progressives like Woodrow
Wilson, Frank Goodnow, and Herbert Croly held the framer’s constitutional limits in contempt.8
4
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Their quasi-Hegelian vision was one of a powerful national government that would subordinate
the state and local governments. That vision was realized in the meta welfare schemes like the
New Deal, the Great Society, and more recently, Obamacare. With cooperative federalism came
practices such as the grants-in-aid, along with conditions, and practices such as direct orders (like
those contained in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act [1972]), crosscutting requirements,
crossover sanctions, and partial preemptions.9 These tools of “intergovernmental relations”
allowed Washington to maintain control over much of state policy, leaving the states as
Derthick’s “inferior governments” in the federal mix. State and local governments have been
conditioned to expect that Washington would be at the head of any crisis like that of 9-11 and
Hurricane Katrina.
References to the “Laboratories of Democracy,” Past and Present
In this initial investigation, I was interested in looking at whether there was a prima facie
case for a shift in attitudes among progressives away from cooperative federalism, based on an
apparent warming to traditional favorable appeals to the tenth amendment and states' rights.
Toward that end, I surveyed peer-reviewed articles over the past twenty years that used the
expression “laboratory of democracy” in its title.10 A conclusion to draw from these articles and
the use of the metaphor in the last twenty years is that, while there are several references to the
the American founding” (Ronald Pestritto, Progressivism and America’s Tradition of Natural Law
and Natural Rights. Natural Law, Natural Rights and the Constitution,
http://www.nlnrac.org/critics/american-progressivism [accessed February 16, 2016]).
9
United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, “The Techniques of
Intergovernmental Relations,” in American Intergovernmental Relations: Foundations,
Perspectives, and Issues, Fifth edition, ed. Laurence O’Toole, Jr. and Robert Christensen
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Congressional Quarterly, 2013), 252-257.
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Because the “articles in social science journals and law reviews quoting Brandeis are too
numerous to list” (Tarr, 2001, 39, n. 11), I narrowed my focus to look at public policy peerreviewed articles where the phrase “laboratory of democracy” or “laboratories of democracy” was
in the title. I found only three articles since 2000 (Tarr, “Laboratories of Democracy?”,
Barrilleaux, and Brace, “Notes from the Laboratories of Democracy,” and Lowery, et al., “Policy
Attention in State and Nation”). When I removed the phrase “public policy,” I got 22 articles
which I narrowed to 10. The narrowing was due to the use of the “laboratories of democracy”
phrase not in keeping with the Brandeis quote. The subject matter of the articles using the
“laboratories of democracy” metaphor varied. Among the topics were clarification of Brandeis’s
metaphor (Tarr, “Laboratories of Democracy?”), state campaign finance reform (Schultz,
“Laboratories of Democracy”), state and market strategies to reduce uninsurance in the states
(Barrilleaux and Brace, “Notes from the Laboratories of Democracy”), federal health care reform
via state health care experimentation (Kucskar, “Laboratories of Democracy”), policy innovation
in decentralized governments (Galle and Leahy, “Laboratories of Democracy?”), state tort law
(Klass, “Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy”), whether state-level policy
diffusion affects national policy agenda setting (Lowery, et al., “Policy Attention in State and
Nation”), lethal injection protocols (Blythe, “’Laboratories of Democracy’ or ‘Machinery of
Death’?”), state constitutions (McGinley, “Results from the Laboratories of Democracy”), and the
status of healthcare reform in gubernatorial elections (Johnson and Kishore, “Laboratories of
Democracy”).
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laboratory of democracy relating to health care policy, the usage of the metaphor is diverse. Few
of the articles analyze the concept; most are content to use it as a catchphrase or as a synonym
for “state policy innovation.” The conclusion that I draw from this is that while the usage of the
metaphor is pervasive according to Tarr, it has not been a sufficiently powerful metaphor to
provide direction, either theoretically or practically for state policy innovation. Furthermore,
there is no indication in the academic literature that the idea of states as laboratories of
democracy supplanted the progressive ideological and pragmatic commitment to cooperative
federalism.
After looking at the peer-reviewed literature, I did a Google search of articles that used
the expression “laboratories of democracy” and “COVID” in their articles during 2020. I
obtained six articles.11 It is these articles that I analyze below, considering whether progressives
are abandoning cooperative federalism in favor of greater regional orientation toward
policymaking.
.
Analysis of Recent Articles Pertaining to the Laboratories of Democracy and the COVID
Pandemic
Recent articles on the pandemic and federalism suggest that progressives might be in
retreat from cooperative federalism and embracing state policy experimentation and
implementation as a proxy for national policy leadership. In this section, the idea that
cooperative federalism might be in retreat will be discussed. This will be followed by a
discussion of the perceived merits of state policy innovation, along with some of its limits.
Is cooperative federalism in retreat among progressives? The idea that cooperative
federalism might be shoved to the side is especially intriguing because “cooperative federalism”
is “progressive federalism.” However, there is some evidence that there are cracks in the
progressive commitment to cooperative federalism. Jenkinson excitedly remarks that “suddenly
the nearly forgotten Tenth Amendment is relevant again!”12 Baker quotes the tenth amendment
as authoritative and praises it as having “empowered state and local governments across America
to make a difference in their communities without the help of Washington.”13 He also treats as
factual the concept of state sovereignty noting that the historical foundations of state sovereignty
are 1) federalism and 2) the laboratories of democracy.”14
Fung attacks the hubris of centralized authority thinking that they know what is “best,”
stating that “It is tempting for those in big central government to think that they know better and
so try to develop the best policies, the best plans, the best forecasts, the best tests and impose
Keeling Baker, “A Progressive Call to Arms: Laboratories of Democracy,” Michael Cornfield,
“The States We're In: Can ‘Laboratories of Democracy’ Conquer Covid-19?,” Phillip Elliot, “Why
State-Run Vaccine Delivery Could be Bumpy,” Archon Fung, “Covid-19 Requires More
Democracy, Not Less,” Clay Jenkinson, “Who's in Charge? Coronavirus and the Tenth
Amendment,” Donald Kettl “States Divided: The Implications of American Federalism for
COVID‐19.” Opinion articles and blogs were excluded.
12
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them on the states and localities. If they had done that in Washington State, more of its residents
would have gotten sick and died.”15 Instead of playing the role that they know what is “best,”
central governments should instead refocus during the pandemic from knowing what is best to
effectively disseminating successful practices to the state and local levels, according to Fung.16
Fung is also not encouraged by other centralized states and their handling of the
pandemic. France, Italy, and Spain have not inspired confidence in their response to the virus and
they are highly centralized states. Kettl points out how the United States is out of step with how
other nations are handling the pandemic and cites Germany as a model to which the United
States should aspire.17 Fung also praises Germany, but for the decentralized features of its state.
He also notes that private and non-profit organizations moved more quickly to implement socialdistancing policies than did Washington.18
A part of the value of decentralized systems is that they provide a check on state powers
to ensure that democratic principles prevail. Fung advances an uncharacteristic progressive
position that democratic principles might conflict with the values of centralized authority and
they might be more in alignment with decentralized authority. Centralized government must
conform to democratic principles. According to Fung, we cannot sacrifice our “democratic
impulse”19 which has manifested itself in practices such as “questioning authority, raising
alternative perspectives, vigorous debate, disagreement, and experimentation” in order to achieve
centralized government. Fung calls this “dangerously misguided.”20
While the assumption among progressives has normally been that “national problems
require national solutions,” some progressives, like Jenkinson, have questioned the assumption.
It is possible that, given our existing federal arrangement, a strong local role might be essential.
He notes that “a patient enters a local hospital to be treated by local medical professionals.”21 He
also remarks that a decentralized approach is needed because a centralized system is missing,
noting that “absent a national health-care system, medical treatment in the United States is
delivered by a dizzying range of systems, with widely different results depending on the
availability of insurance, affordability and coverage options, but also social class and regional
political philosophies.”22
A foundational principle of cooperative federalism is the preference for expert
knowledge, favoring it over the constitutional principle of government by consent.23 But Fung
Fung, “COVID-19 Requires More Democracy, Not Less.”
Ibid.
17
Kettl, “States Divided.”
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Fung, “COVID-19 Requires More Democracy, Not Less.”
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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“The idea of separating politics and administration—of grounding a significant portion of
government not on the basis of popular consent but on expertise—was a fundamental aim of
American Progressivism and explains the Progressives’ fierce assault on the Founders’ separationof-powers constitutionalism” (Ronald Pestritto, “The Birth of the Administrative State: Where it
15
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undermines the commitment to uniform expert knowledge during the pandemic, noting that
“scientists and experts rarely speak with one voice, and this pandemic is no exception...Experts
make mistakes just like the rest of us; they are fallible.”24
Two cheers for the laboratories of democracy. When comparing the states to the
national government, progressives often portray states as too parochial and sectarian to be
leaders of national policy, thinking of them as the “the neglected middle children of
federalism...”25 However, during the pandemic, a different attitude was reflected among some
progressives. Some of the praise for state government was for progressive governors. In history,
Robert LaFollette, and more recently, Governors Newsom, Cuomo, and Inslee have been praised
as “national leaders,” and even “almost shadow presidents.”26 Cornfield noted that “Cuomo is
the biggest star in a constellation of governors made famous by the pandemic.”27 Publicly, the
most visible demonstrations of their policies are the wearing of masks, the testing for the virus,
and the practice of “social distancing.”
There has also been praise for states as the innovators of policy like the state of
Massachusetts with its Health Care Act which was the precursor to Obamacare. 28 Baker praises
California as “the state leading the charge for progressive policy experimentation”29 while
Jenkinson praises Colorado as a laboratory of democracy in the area of medicinal and
recreational marijuana: “Colorado was thus a ‘laboratory’ in which to work out the kinks of
legalization in one jurisdiction, from which other states could learn important lessons of what to
do and not to do if they chose to follow suit.”30
However, not all progressives commenting on the pandemic are sanguine about relying
on the laboratories of democracy during a crisis like the pandemic. Elliot, for example, is critical
of a state-run distribution of the vaccine as opposed to a national policy. He suggests that
“laboratories for democracy sounds honorable when it comes to tax policy but may prove to be
folly when it comes to serving a lifeline to a country hobbled by a pandemic” and compares
dealing with the pandemic like fighting a domestic war.31 However, Jenkinson disagrees saying
that the Trump Administration is right when it says that “one size fits all” will not work in every
case. It is “an imprecise tool with which to combat the pandemic.”32

Came from and What it Means for Limited Government,” Heritage Foundation First Principles
Series, no. 16, November 20, 2007, https://www.heritage.org/political-process/report/the-birth-theadministrative-state-where-it-came-and-what-it-means-limited [accessed January 31, 2018]).
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Kettl’s critique of the laboratories of democracy focuses on the condition that any
promise of states fulfilling such a role is constrained by other factors outside of the state’s
control. The state’s response to COVID is not just a reaction to a crisis; their response is made in
a broader policy context, a “policy stream,” from which policy decisions are made. Kettl sees
this as a problem for the states acting as laboratories of democracy, because needed practices like
testing and experimentation were not at the forefront of these state “laboratories” during the
pandemic. As Kettl puts it, “COVID-19 created a laboratory, but one without experimentation.”33

Discussion and Conclusion
In this final section, I will draw some conclusion about progressives and their commitments to
cooperative federalism and progressive principles. Also, the role that the framer’s federalism
continues to play and the Christian’s commitment to the Christian worldview in light of the
discoveries highlighted will be evaluated in this paper.
Progressives, cooperative federalism, and the laboratories of democracy. Since only
some progressives appear friendlier with the tenth amendment and “states’ rights” since the
pandemic and the academic literature with respect to the “laboratories of democracy” is diverse,
and there is little analysis of the “laboratories of democracy” concept as an adequate descriptive
framework for federalism, there is faint evidence that the changes in the rhetoric on the part of
progressives in this pandemic are attributable to substantive philosophical or world view
changes. Of course, we can't say definitively that there is not a latent change among progressives
in place or that we will not see further motion toward progressive federalism that favors
decentralization. A reasonable explanation both from past academic literature and current
popular articles is that this shift away from cooperative federalism does not represent a
fundamental change in progressive ideology. Rather, the idea that the shift represents a change in
strategy should be further explored by future researchers.
Another area that should be further explored is the role that the Trump administration
might have played in the progressive’s more favorable views toward traditional federalist
concepts such as the tenth amendment, and states’ rights. There were some articles during the
Trump presidency, but prior to 2020, that also spoke favorably of the laboratories of democracy.
Perhaps the progressive shift was political and that a shift in progressive views on federalism
was apparent during the Trump administration and before the pandemic.
The Constitution, federalism, and the laboratories of democracy. Whether modern
progressivism is departing from cooperative federalism has implications for federalism provided
by the framers. For example, if progressives have softened their animus toward the tenth
amendment, we might witness an ideological realignment with respect to the theories of the
Constitution that progressives espouse.
Some of the authors, like Jenkinson, speak of the tenth amendment and even “state
sovereignty” as authoritative.34 However, Jenkinson also says that “The Constitution does not
33
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provide clear guidelines for elected officials or government functionaries.”35 And while it is true
that the Constitution does not provide a bright line between the state role and the national role in
a pandemic, it does provide a set of principles such as federalism, the separation of powers, and
checks and balances that encourage decentralization and the diffusion of power across political
actors and across regions.
Fung suggests that progressives should disregard the law if the goal is to advance greater
knowledge of the disease, like tracking the spread of the virus. Fung praises Dr. Helen Chu’s
decision to defy the law to repurpose her study to track the spread of the COVID-19 virus within
the state even though Dr. Chu not only defied the law, but also risked subject confidentiality.
The Constitution which represents our fundamental law cannot be discarded so
frivolously during a crisis. Sadly, past American history has demonstrated too often that during
times of national crises, like the Civil War or the Depression, the Constitution is one of the early
casualties.
The rule of law is not the only constitutional principle likely to be imperiled during a
crisis. A lot of historical baggage has been laid at the feet of federalism by progressives, namely,
that federalism advanced historical segregation and slavery. However, Justice Clarence Thomas
noted that, “federalism, per se, is not an evil or a good, it is just a construct, just as the separation
of powers is a construct—they are both means that serve certain ends.”36
Federalism and the commitment to a Christian worldview. Like the separation of
powers or checks and balances, federalism is a construct of process. It is one of James Madison’s
“auxiliary precautions” (Federalist #51) designed to check the advance of tyrannical government.
So, while federalism may not be a moral principle like honesty or fidelity, the aims of its framers
were moral with the purpose of advancing human flourishing along with the security that
governments fulfill their role as the ministers of God for the good of the people (Romans 13:4).
And that sounds a lot like securing “the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity” as
stated in the Constitution’s Preamble.
The implementation of the framer’s constitutional principles has resulted in a diffusion of
power and authority, leading to a general benefit for humankind. In contrast, progressives have
tended to place their bet on the ideas and policies of a few planners rather than the many citizens.
However, even Fung agrees that “in situations of high stakes and high uncertainty, it is better to
attempt many strategies and learn from experience rather than placing one big bet.”37 And while
it might be prudent to centralize some elements of policy during a crisis, it is equally prudent that
social problems that are greater in number and complexity need a like increase in the number of
minds engaged in solving those problems. During a crisis, nations need an increase in intellectual
resources. That increase in the number of people and institutions requires a diffusion of power
and authority that constitutional federalism affords.
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